We study how US branch banking deregulations a¤ected the entry and exit of …rms in the non-…nancial sector using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database. The comprehensive micro-data allow us to study how the entry rate, the distribution of entry sizes, and survival rates for …rms responded to changes in banking competition. We also distinguish the relative e¤ect of the policy reforms on the entry of startups versus facility expansions by existing …rms. We …nd that the deregulations reduced …nancing constraints, particularly among small startups, and improved allocative e¢ ciency across the entire …rm size distribution. However, the US deregulations also led to a dramatic increase in 'churning' at the lower end of the size distribution, where new startups fail within the …rst three years following entry. This churning emphasizes a new mechanism through which …nancial sector reforms impact product markets. It is not exclusively better ex ante allocation of capital to quali…ed projects that causes creative destruction; rather banking deregulations can also 'democratize' entry by allowing many more startups to be founded. The vast majority of these new entrants fail along the way, but a few survive ex post to displace incumbents.
Introduction
The …nancial sector's role for driving economic growth and development has received increasing attention in recent years, with several authors articulating a positive relationship between …nancial development and economic growth at the cross-country level (e.g., Beck et al. 2000 ; Levine 1997 ; Levine et al. 2000) . This research argues that better …nancing environments are associated with higher economic growth, at least in part, because they facilitate better allocation of capital across investment opportunities, thereby promoting entrepreneurship and the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction (e.g., King and Levine 1993a,b; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Bertrand et al. 2006 ).
Despite the wealth of cross-country research, however, there are few empirical studies that directly examine how changes in …nancial markets impact the entry and exit of …rms in product markets (e.g., Black Understanding the micro-mechanisms through which the …nancing environment impacts industry structure and economic growth is particularly important given that theoretical models relating …nancial development to product market outcomes often yield ambiguous, or even opposing, predictions. 2 This paper studies how the US banking deregulations that lifted local banking monopolies from the late 1970s through the early 1990s impacted entrepreneurship and industry structure in non-…nancial sectors. The structure of the banking industry is a major in ‡uence on the …nancing environment faced by …rms, with bank debt comprising up to 60% of their total borrowings (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994) . Small businesses, and new ventures in particular, rely heavily on banks for …nancing their operations as they have fewer outside sources of …nancing (e.g., Berger and Udell 2002; Fluck et al. 1998) . Reducing distortions in the banking sector, such as lifting local monopolies in banking markets, can therefore have …rst-order e¤ects on product market outcomes.
We examine how the entry rates, the distributions of entry sizes, and the survival rates for …rms in product markets responded to changes in banking competition. We employ detailed establishment-level data collected by the US Census Bureau that annually tracks every US private-sector establishment from 1976 to 1999. While our study is most closely related to Black and Strahan (2002) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) , three particular advantages of these data facilitate a more detailed examination of the mechanisms through which the deregulations 1 Most research examining …nancing constraints focuses on established …rms (e.g., Banerjee 2 Levine (1997) outlines the ambiguous predictions of enhanced liquidity on economic growth. Black and Strahan (2002) outline two opposing channels through which banking deregulations impact entrepreneurship. a¤ected entry and exit. First, the data cover all US establishments, including private …rms, small businesses, and 'micro' establishments of one or more individuals. We can thus characterize better the impacts of the reforms across the entire …rm size distribution. These better data are especially true for the very small startups that are likely to be most a¤ected by capital constraints for entry but are often excluded or subsampled in large-scale datasets.
Second, the panel nature of the data allows us to track individual establishments over time. This feature allows us to separate analyses of entry rates (i.e., the extensive margin) from estimations of changes in entry sizes (i.e., the intensive margin). We do so through studies of the entry size distribution and of the size of entrants in their …rst year compared to subsequent growth within-establishment. This delineation improves upon aggregate metrics like average entry size that confound the two margins. 3 The panel structure also a¤ords a detailed study of survival rates for new entrants, which again can be considered at di¤erent points in the entry size distribution.
Third, we can separate new establishments into startups and additional facilities being opened by existing …rms. This feature allows us to compare how the banking deregulations impacted the entry and exit of startups -that in general face greater …nancing constraints -to the entry and closure of plants by multi-unit …rms. In addition to having substantive value, this distinction is also valuable from an econometric standpoint as it allows us to control for a greater set of omitted variables than prior studies. By using the facility expansions of existing …rms as a 'within stateindustry-year' baseline against which to compare the founding of new ventures, we are able to control both for annual changes in the overall entry rates of startups versus existing …rms and for aggregate entry conditions at the state-industry-year level. Our identi…cation strategy therefore isolates the impact that changes in the …nancing environment have on entrepreneurship over-and-above the increase in facility expansions by existing …rms. 4 Similar to Black and Strahan (2002) , we …nd that the interstate banking deregulations led to a substantial increase in the entry rates of startups. Our work further demonstrates that startups exhibited a greater increase in entry than facility expansions and that this e¤ect was particularly strong among establishments entering with 20 employees or fewer. Moreover, for those …rms that survived at least three years, startups entered at larger sizes relative to new establishments of existing …rms. These results provide compelling evidence that the deregulations reduced …nancing constraints and that startups -which tend to have fewer sources of external …nance and hence are more sensitive to reductions in interest rates or credit rationing -bene…ted more from the deregulations than existing …rms.
We also …nd that the increase in startup activity relative to facility expansions is present, albeit smaller, at the higher end of the size distribution. Since …rms that are entering at over 100 employees are not as likely to be credit constrained on the extensive margin, this …nding is consistent with the view that deregulation improved allocative e¢ ciency across the …rm size distribution, so that good investment ideas of startups were more likely to be …nanced despite the fact that they were not 'insiders' or privileged clients (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Laeven 2000; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Bertrand et al. 2006 ).
The most striking feature of the US deregulations, however, was the dramatic increase in the entry of establishments that fail within three years. This 'churning'was particularly strong for small …rms. For example, startup establishments entering with 6-20 employees experienced an over 30% increase in churning relative to facility expansions of multi-unit …rms. This strong increase in churning following the deregulations cannot be explained solely within a model of better ex ante allocation of capital to quali…ed projects. Rather, another channel through which banking competition facilitates the process of creative destruction is to allow many more startups to be founded, only some of which survive ex post to displace eventually incumbents. This process suggests that the relative impacts of banking deregulation on entrepreneurship may far exceed impacts on the displacement of incumbents, which we show to be consistent with the US experience.
Our …ndings are relevant to the developing empirical literature documenting how reforms to the banking sector may positively impact the real economy through the reallocation of resources in non-…nancial sectors (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2006; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Cetorelli 2004) . This study provides further evidence that well functioning capital markets strengthen entrepreneurship in local economies, but also better characterizes the mechanisms surrounding this entry. Most importantly, deregulation may facilitate creative destruction through the 'democratization' of entry rather than just through ex ante allocative e¢ ciency. These results complement Bertrand et al.'s (2006) study of the French banking deregulations'impact for …rms with over 100 employees.
Our results also complement prior research examining the relationship between banking structure and lending to existing small businesses (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995) . Although the theory is ambiguous as to whether concentrated banking markets are good for entrepreneurship, our results support the view that more competitive banking markets have a positive e¤ect on the entry of small, …nancially constrained …rms (e.g., Erel 2006; Berger et al. 2005; Black and Strahan 2002) . However, our …ndings on churning paint a richer portrait of how banking deregulations impact product markets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed description of the theoretical considerations and our empirical approach. The third section introduces the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and compares the aggregate entry behavior of startup …rms and multi-unit facility expansions. We report our panel estimation results on the entry rates, entry sizes, survival, and churning of new establishments in Section 4. Sections 3 and 4 also provide new evidence from the LBD regarding changes in banking structure following the deregulations. In Section 5, we conclude our study by identifying further how our results …t into the literature and the areas for future research.
Theoretical Considerations and Estimation Design
Our empirical approach exploits cross-state variation in the timing of branch banking deregulations in the US. The 1970s through the mid 1990s experienced a signi…cant liberalization in the ability of banks to establish branches and to expand across state borders (either through new branches or acquisitions). Prior to these liberalizations, banks faced multiple restrictions on geographic expansion both within and across states.
The McFadden Act of 1927 required national banks to obey state-level restrictions on branching, e¤ectively prohibiting cross-state branch banking. In addition, many states developed stringent rules governing the conduct of branch banking within their territories. The most restrictive of these, known as unit banking, limited each bank to a single branch. Although banks responded to these restrictions by forming multibank holding companies (MBHCs) that owned more than one bank, states in turn restricted the activities of MBHCs. Restrictions on intrastate branching for MBHCs focused on the market share and concentration of these holding companies, while the Douglas Amendment of 1956 prevented a MBHC from owning banks across state borders.
As shown in the Figure 1 , only 12 states had some form of intrastate branch banking deregulation prior to 1970, and no state allowed interstate branch banking. Starting in the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, most states passed laws deregulating the restrictions on the ability of banks to open or acquire new branches. Two classes of restrictions were eased over this period. First, intrastate deregulations for branch banking allowed banks to expand within the passing state either by acquiring other bank branches or by setting up new bank branches themselves. This allowed for more competition in the local banking market, in some cases even breaking-up e¤ective monopolies that existed prior to these liberalizations. 5 The intrastate branch banking deregulations consist of two elements. The …rst deregulation allows banks to expand within states through mergers and acquisitions. The second allows banks to open de novo branches. We focus on the leading edge of these intrastate reforms in this paper.
Second, interstate branch banking deregulations allowed banks to acquire branches in other states with which their 'home state'had negotiated such a bilateral agreement. This class of reforms further reduced the monopoly power of local banks, in particular due to the signi…cant improvements in the market for corporate control (e.g., Berger et al. 2001 ). 6 In part due to reciprocal nature of these agreements, most states undertook interstate deregulations in the mid 1980s to early 1990s. These state-level reforms culminated in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994, which overturned the McFadden Act and allowed national interstate branch banking after 1995. In e¤ect, the Riegle-Neal Act put out-of-state banks on par with local banks in every state, with important implications for capital reserves and banking e¢ ciency across the industry. 7 The period following the liberalization of interstate branch banking led to an expansion of the large MBHCs across state borders and a signi…cant fall in the number of small local banks. Table  1A documents aggregate changes in the banking sector taken from the LBD. The total number of banks fell by 30% from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s. The share of large banks, de…ned as having more than 500 employees, and the share of branches controlled by large banks increased over the same period. There was also a sharp increase in the share of branches controlled by out-of-state banks, growing from 2% to 25%, suggesting a robust market for corporate control across state borders. 8 Our …ndings on the changes in the banking industry using the LBD data mirror those using bank assets rather than bank employees as a metric for bank size. For example, Berger et al. (2001) …nd that the fall in the number of banks is almost completely accounted for by the reduction in small banks with assets under $100m. Moreover, they …nd that the percentage of industry assets managed by 'megabanks'(i.e., with more than $100b in assets) almost doubled from 1977 to 1994. The percentage of industry assets managed by small banks, on the other hand, halved over the same period.
The increase in banking competition and strengthening of the market for corporate control due to the deregulations are thought to have improved allocative e¢ ciency by allowing capital to ‡ow more freely towards projects yielding the highest returns and to more e¢ cient producers. Moreover, although the number of banks fell over this period, the number of bank branches increased considerably, re ‡ecting greater competition and increased consumer choice in local 6 The interstate deregulations may have also improved economies of scale, although Berger et al. (2001) argue that the mergers resulted in few cost savings on average. 7 The Riegle-Neal Act opened up nationwide acquisition of banks across state lines so that a bank in any state could acquire another bank in any state, regardless of whether their respective 'home states'had negotiated an agreement allowing cross-state acquisitions (unless a state explicitly opted out). In addition, the Riegle-Neal Act allowed banks to set up new branches across state borders without the need to acquire a subsidiary bank, and MBHCs could convert subsidiaries into branches. Kane (1996) carefully discusses the Riegle-Neal Act. 8 The …nancial sector is less precisely measured than product markets in the LBD prior to 1992. These banking statistics, nevertheless, are indicative of the substantial shifts in the sector's structure during this period. See also Berger et al. (2001) and Janicki and Prescott (2006) . markets. From a theoretical perspective, these reforms could have had a strong positive e¤ect on entrepreneurship if startups face substantial credit constraints. Moreover, since entrepreneurs have fewer non-bank options for …nancing their projects relative to existing …rms (e.g., internal cash ‡ow, bond markets), more e¢ cient allocation of capital within the banking industry should lead to larger increases in startup entry relative to facility expansions by existing …rms.
However, there are two theoretical reasons why these reforms may instead harm the entry of startups. First, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that startups bene…t from concentrated banking markets because a monopolist bank can engage in inter-temporal cross-subsidization of loans. As a monopolist bank can charge above-market interest rates to mature …rms, they can in turn charge below-market rates to potential entrepreneurs. By doing so, the monopolist bank can maximize the long-term pool of older …rms to which they lend. Increased competition weakens the market power of local banks for mature …rms, reducing their ability to charge above-market rates, and thereby weakens their incentives for charging below-market rates to new entrants as well.
Second, several studies argue that small banks have a comparative advantage relative to large banks at making lending decisions for startups because they are better at screening on 'soft' versus 'hard'information (e.g., Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005) . If lending decisions in larger banks are based on a more hierarchical decision process, the ultimate adjudication decisions may come from o¢ cers who do not know potential borrowers personally. These decisions are more likely to be based on credit scoring models that inherently focus on hard information. On the other hand, local loan o¢ cers at small banks know information about borrowers that cannot be condensed into a credit score. This ability to lend and monitor based on soft information may give local loan o¢ cers a comparative advantage in lending to entrepreneurs. Since the banking reforms led to a shift in industry structure from small banks towards large banks, this could have had a direct negative e¤ect on lending to startups relative to established …rms with a history of audited accounts. On both fronts, therefore, this second set of theories suggest that entrepreneurs may have su¤ered from the banking deregulations.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , the timings of the intrastate and interstate branch banking deregulations are su¢ ciently di¤erent and independent across states that we can jointly investigate the e¤ect of these two reforms on startup entry. The intrastate deregulation captures the relative trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ ciency from increased competition and the potential cost to entrepreneurs from a loss of concentrated markets. The interstate deregulation captures the trade-o¤ between these e¢ ciencies and the potential cost to entrepreneurs from the shift away from small banks as a source of small business lending. Our study can therefore also be seen as a test for the presence of …nancing constraints in entrepreneurship. Since there are several theoretical channels through which banking competition may hinder startup activity, evidence of a net increase in entrepreneurship relative to facility expansions of existing …rms would indicate a strong, positive bene…t to entrepreneurship through increased competition among banks.
We construct tight comparisons of startup entry rates to the facility expansions of existing …rms that remove all local conditions common to the two types of entrants. We use the facility expansion comparison, rather than …rm growth through employment adjustments at existing plants, to create a baseline with similar discontinuous …nancing requirements. We further control for aggregate changes in entry rates for both types of …rms. This platform is only feasible due to our establishment-level data. Since the cross-state variation in the timing of the reforms may have been correlated with the structure of the banking industry 9 , prior research regarding the e¤ect of these banking deregulations on the non-…nancial sector relies on interactions between the timing of the reforms and each industry's dependence on external …nance to achieve identi…cation (e.g., Cetorelli and Gambera 2001; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). We go further by exploiting variation across types of entrants within state-industry-year cells. This estimation approach controls for a greater set of omitted factors than earlier work, and we utilize a dynamic model that parses out transitory features of the adjustment process. Most importantly, though, the elasticities of establishment openings for existing …rms provide an important benchmark for isolating the relative importance of these deregulations for entrepreneurship speci…cally.
Longitudinal Business Database
The data for this study are drawn from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, the LBD provides annual observations for every private-sector establishment with payroll from 1976 to 1999. Approximately 3.9m establishments, representing over 68m employees, are included each year. As the micro-records document the universe of establishments and …rms, rather than a strati…ed random sample or published aggregate tabulations, the Census Bureau data is an unparalleled laboratory for studying entrepreneurship rates and the life cycles of …rms in the US. In addition, the LBD lists the physical location of establishments rather than the location where they are incorporated, which allows us to circumvent issues related to higher incorporations in certain states like Delaware. 9 Accounts of the political-economy of the reforms suggest their passage are mostly exogenous to product markets, driven in part by federal actions and state-level structure of the banking industry. Black and Strahan (2001) argue that some of the impetus for the intrastate deregulations came from initiatives taken by the O¢ ce of the Comptroller of the Currency that put banks with national charters on par with Savings and Loans (S&Ls) and savings banks that could branch freely within states. The interstate deregulations were driven in part by the S&L crisis in the early 1980s when federal legislators allowed failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by banks in any state, regardless of the state laws governing these transactions. These paved the way for bilateral negotiations between various states to allow interstate banking to capture the bene…ts of larger, diversi…ed banks that were less susceptible to failure. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) also note that the timing of the reforms are driven in part by the relative strength of banking interest groups that favored the deregulation. These issues are further discussed below. Appendix Table 1 lists each state and the dates of the branch banking deregulations.
The comprehensive nature of the LBD facilitates the development of complete state-industryyear panels of birth counts by type of …rm and the distribution of establishment entry sizes (in terms of employment). Each establishment is given a unique, time-invariant identi…er that can be longitudinally tracked. This allows us to identify the year of entry for new startups or the opening of new plants by existing …rms. 10 Second, the LBD assigns a …rm identi…er to each establishment that facilitates a linkage to other establishments in LBD. This …rm hierarchy allows us to separate new startups from expansions by existing multi-unit …rms.
Publicly available series do not provide birth counts by state-industry cells; even when they do provide approximations based on total employment, the Census Bureau is required to suppress values that compromise the con…dentiality of individual establishments. Moreover, the entry of startups versus expansion establishments is not released. Building from the microdata overcomes these limitations. Our data include the manufacturing, services, retail trade, wholesale trade, mining, transportation, and construction sectors from 1977 to 1998. 11 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on entrants in our sample. Over 80% of the 400k new establishments opened in each year are new …rm formations. Figure 2 plots the relative entry counts over time of startup establishments and the expansion establishments of existing …rms, with entry counts in 1977-1981 normalized to 100% for each group. While startups constitute the vast majority of new establishments, this time plot demonstrates that the relative increase in startup activity has consistently lagged that of expansion establishments since the early 1980s. There is only a 10% increase in the raw number of startup entrants over the twenty-year period, despite a 20% overall growth in LBD employment. Measured in terms of rates, Davis et al.
(2006) document a substantial reduction in business entry and exit from the late 1970s to the late 1990s using the LBD. Figure 2 also documents a broad decline in entry during the early 1990s. This is consistent with the decline in credit available to …rms during this period (e.g., Berger et al. 2001; Zarutskie 2006) These aggregate trends are important when interpreting the upcoming panel estimation results. We will control for the aggregate trends of startups and expansion entry by existing …rms with separate year …xed e¤ects for each type of …rm. These panel e¤ects remove aggregate trends that a¤ect these two groups di¤erently and would otherwise bias the parameter estimates (e.g., di¤erent cyclical volatilities for …rm formations). These aggregate trends, however, include overall movements in credit access that are partly due to deregulations. The inference of panel 10 We de…ne entry for a given establishment as the …rst year that it has positive employment. We do not include exit and re-entry in our birth counts. The data begin in 1976, and we consider entry from 1977 onward.
11 Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the LBD. Sectors not included in the LBD are agriculture, forestry and …shing, public administration, and private households. We also exclude the US postal service, restaurants and food stores, hospitals, education services, and social services. estimations using the cross-state banking variation is in part from greater or weaker relative declines in startup entry rates for states that have deregulated versus those that have not.
While startups account for the majority of new establishments, existing …rms open new establishments at much larger sizes. New establishments of existing …rms start on average with four times the employment of startups. Figure 3 documents the distribution of establishment entry sizes for these types of …rms. 76% of new startups begin with …ve or fewer employees, versus 44% for expansion establishments of existing …rms. These distributions suggest startups may face constraints on the intensive margin of entry size as well as the extensive margin of entry rates. Looking at the capital-intensive manufacturing sector in Figure 4 , the distribution di¤erentials are even more pronounced. There are, however, many other factors that need to be considered in modelling starting establishment size to isolate the role of …nancing constraints. 12 Manufacturing accounts for just under 10% of the total entry; manufacturing, services, wholesale trade, and retail trade jointly account for 75% of the total entry of new establishments. 13 Despite the well-documented concentration of high-tech entrepreneurship within regions like Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128, the broad entry and exit rates we consider are more evenly spread across US regions. There are also no substantial di¤erences in the extent to which startups versus existing …rms open new establishments across regions. These geographic regularities aid our using of cross-state variation in banking deregulations to study entrepreneurship, as the results are not overly dependent upon the outcomes of a single state or region.
14 Table 2 also shows that the aggregate distributions of establishment exits across the size distribution, industries, and geographic regions are relatively similar to entry for the period of study. On the other hand, the rate of 'churning'-de…ned as establishments that exit within three years of entry -is much larger for startups (46%) relative to that of established …rms (28%) and more concentrated at the lower end of the size distribution.
Empirical Results
This section reports our empirical results regarding establishment entry rates, entry sizes, exit rates, and churning. We begin with state-year panel estimations that separately examine the entry rates of startups and expansion establishments. We then turn to dynamic tests and 12 Dunne et al. (1989) provide additional details on entry patterns in the manufacturing sector. 13 The exclusion of health, education, social services, and community organizations reduces the proportion of services entry in the sample relative to the overall population. The relative entry and exit of startups versus existing …rms in retail trade and construction are quite di¤erent. Our core estimations control for detailed industry di¤erences, and we have further con…rmed that our results are robust to excluding these sectors entirely.
14 See Dumais et al. (2002) and Ellison et al. (2007) for further studies of startup and existing …rm expansion agglomeration and coagglomeration, respectively. stacked regressions to focus on more stringent identi…cation of the e¤ect of banking deregulation on entry rates and entry sizes of startups relative to those of existing …rms. Lastly, we consider establishment exits and the churning process using the empirical apparatus developed with the entry regressions.
Our results suggest that US banking deregulations reduced …nancing constraints and improved ex ante allocative e¢ ciency. However, we also show that the deregulations substantially increased 'churning'of startups at the lower end of the size distribution. This more prominent …nding suggests that reduced distortions in the US banking industry 'democratized'entry among startups in product markets. While some of these startups survived ex post to enable the process of creative destruction, much of the startup entry at the lower end of the size distribution was short-lived.
Pre-Post Estimations of Entry Rates at the State-Year Level
Our characterization of banking deregulations and entry rates begins with a simple panel data model at the state-year level. The estimation takes the form,
where s and t are vectors of state and year …xed e¤ects, respectively. The state e¤ects control for …xed di¤erences in entry rates across states due to factors like California's larger economic size. The year e¤ects account for aggregate changes in entry rates over time that result from the business cycle, national policy changes, and so on. BIR st is the total count of establishment births in the state-year cell for the indicated T ype of …rm: startups or existing …rms. T RA st and T ER st model the intrastate and interstate banking deregulations, respectively. These indicator variables take a value of zero before the deregulations and one afterwards. As BIR st is measured in logs, the coe¢ cients measure the mean percentage increase in a state's births in the years following the deregulations. 15 Panel A of Table 3 reports two regressions for three samples: all sectors, manufacturing only, and non-manufacturing. The …rst regression of each set considers startup entry rates, while the second regression focuses on the entry rates of new establishments opened by existing …rms. These six regressions are all undertaken at the state-year level, so that the observation counts 15 The LBD is centered on March of each year. We thus date the reforms such that a passage of T RA in 1987, for example, is coded as changing from 0 to 1 in 1988. We also include in each regression an interaction of the reforms with an indicator for an Economic Census year (i.e., 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997) . In these years, more manpower is devoted to updating the business registry. As a result, longitudinal bumps occur in establishment entry counts for both types of …rms. These interactions ‡exibly accommodate these shifts, although the interactions are insigni…cant and their coe¢ cients are not informative. They can be excluded from the regressions without impacting the results. See Autor et al. (2007) for further details.
do not change across columns. We conservatively cluster standard errors at the state crosssectional level to address the serial correlation concerns for di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimations of Bertrand et al. (2004) . Regressions are weighted by 1977-1985 total birth employment in the state cell; these weights do not change across entrant types. 16 The speci…cations …nd that interstate banking deregulation is consistently associated with higher rates of startup entry. The coe¢ cient elasticity of 6% is smaller, but similar in direction, to the 11% elasticity of Black and Strahan (2002) using Dun & Bradstreet incorporations. This positive response is evident for the whole sample and for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing subsamples. In unreported regressions examining sectors with the non-manufacturing subsample, stronger e¤ects are found in wholesale and retail trade than in services. Nevertheless, a higher and statistically signi…cant entry of startups following the interstate reform is evident for each sector analyzed. We …nd the intrastate banking deregulation is associated with higher entry rates in manufacturing sector only. For non-manufacturers, which again comprise the bulk of the sample, no e¤ect on entry is registered. 17 These results suggest the interstate branch banking deregulations had a very large economic impact, leading to a 6% growth in startup birth rates. It is premature, however, to infer that these deregulations have a direct, causal bene…t for entrepreneurship. Looking at the establishment entry rates of existing …rms, the second regression of each set, we …nd a similar pattern of coe¢ cients. The interstate banking deregulations are associated with higher entry rates that are statistically di¤erent from zero. Although the estimated elasticity of 4% for facility expansions is somewhat weaker than the 6% estimated for startups, we cannot reject that these elasticities are the same statistically.
Dynamic Estimations of Entry Rates at the State-Year Level
The pre-post estimations …nd higher entry rates for both start-ups and facility expansions around the interstate deregulations. It is possible, of course, that the deregulations were a response to greater levels of economic activity, including entrepreneurship, rather than the cause of them. For example, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue that the timing of the reforms are driven in part by the relative strength of banking interest groups that favored the deregulation. In order to examine this proposition more carefully, we turn to dynamic extensions of (1) that identify whether the timing of product market entry following the deregulations is in a pattern consistent with a causal interpretation. 18 These speci…cations take the form,
The post-reform indicators in (1), T RA st and T ER st , are replaced by a series of lead and lag indicators. T RA st+4 and T ER st+4 take a unit value four or more years after the deregulation. The variables P 3 q= 2
T RA st+q and P 3 q= 2
T ER st+q are six separate indicator variables that span the six-year period from two years prior to the reform to three years after the reform. These six indicators take a unit value in their speci…c lead or lag year and are zero otherwise. Their coe¢ cient pattern thus models the short-term dynamic e¤ects around the reform, with T RA st+4 and T ER st+4 capturing outcomes four or more years after the deregulations.
Our main coe¢ cients of interest are the long-term e¤ects T RAt+4 and T ERt+4 . The coe¢ cients P 3 q= 2 T RAt+q and P 3 q= 2 T ERt+q focus on the timing of the reform and document whether the entry of new establishments following the reforms is consistent with a causal e¤ect. In particular, we should be concerned if a strong lead e¤ect is evident just before the deregulations are passed, regardless of whether it is heightened or diminished entry counts, as this would suggest an omitted factor is highly correlated with the timing of the deregulations. We also want to con…rm that the dynamic pattern of e¤ects leading into the long-term e¤ects makes economic sense. The coe¢ cient values for the leads and lags in (2) are relative to the period three years before the reforms and earlier; by comparison, the post indicators in (1) are relative to period immediately before the reforms. Table 3 reports six speci…cations that again examine startups and facility expansions both within and outside of the manufacturing sector. To conserve space, we report in Table 3 a condensed form of (2) where the six single-year leads and lags are consolidated into three two-year increments. The long-term e¤ects are still captured by the four-year lag coe¢ -cients T RAt+4 and T ERt+4 . Appendix Table 2 reports the complete dynamic speci…cations for the full sample.
Panel B of
The dynamic speci…cations show a very consistent entry response for startups and facility expansions to the interstate banking deregulation. In both cases, the forward e¤ect is of a small magnitude and not statistically di¤erent from zero. After the reforms, the coe¢ cients show an increasing pattern consistent with growing …nancial access due to greater bank competition.
banking sector. Such a test has yet to be documented in a consistent way in the literature. Endogeneity in the banking sector can still be viewed as exogenous to the product markets, especially the relative impacts for startups versus facility expansions that we study later in this section. The stacked speci…cations ultimately remove all state-industry-year trends.
The long-run magnitudes again maintain the expected order, with startups having a greater elasticity than the expansion establishment formations of existing …rms. No consistent e¤ect is again evident for the intrastate deregulations.
The second and third sets of regressions in Panel B highlight that the long-run elasticities of entry in non-manufacturing sectors are higher than those in the manufacturing sector. Some may …nd this surprising given the perceived higher …nancial dependency of manufacturing. Two notes can be made. First, many industries within manufacturing (e.g., leather goods) are less dependent on external …nance than those in trade or services; we test directly the …nancial dependency prediction later in this section and …nd some evidence for it. More importantly, manufacturing is experiencing stagnant employment trends during this period, while other sectors are expanding. It is not surprising that the elasticities of establishment entry to changes in …nancing constraints are weaker for a declining sector. For a hypothetical industry with no entrepreneurial enticement, the expected elasticity from the deregulations would be zero.
To verify that our results are being driven by enhanced bank competition following the deregulations, we also consider dynamic speci…cations that analyze how the US deregulations impacted the commercial banking industry itself. These estimations, available upon request, show a sharp increase in the number of out-of-state banks following the interstate deregulations. Moreover, a signi…cant proportion of this growth was driven by large banks with an average of 500 or more employees prior over the period 1977-1985. The trends con…rm deregulation's role in the descriptive statistics outlined in Table 1 . The observed growth of out-of-state banks following the interstate deregulations is informative of the mechanism through which banking liberalizations impacted entry in the non-…nancial sector. Both factors follow the interstate deregulations in dynamically consistent patterns, with limited to no response to intrastate deregulations. Taken together, these results suggest that increased competition from out-of-state banks played a particularly important role in promoting entry of new establishments, both of new startups and of existing …rms, following the interstate deregulations. 19 
Stacked Estimations of Entry Rates at the State-Industry-TypeYear Level
The state-year panel estimations provide us with two pieces of evidence for moving forward. First, we note that the most simple estimation highlights that interstate deregulations had a positive, signi…cant e¤ect on the entry of new establishments. Moreover, this entry response is dynamically consistent with the view that greater competition from out-of-state banks increased credit for startup …rms. While this e¤ect is stronger for startup establishments, we also noted the somewhat smaller, but still statistically signi…cant, response for the entry of expansion establishments associated with existing …rms. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two entry elasticities are the same at the state-year level.
A potential concern with the results so far is that they may be driven by unobserved changes in industry structure or similar factors that are correlated with changes in the structure of the banking industry. For example, changes in technology may be independently associated with structural changes in both sectors. 20 In this section, therefore, we move to a more stringent di¤erences-in-di¤erences speci…cation that directly contrasts the e¤ect of the banking deregulations on startups with facility expansions by established …rms. The empirical claim is that facility expansions can serve as an appropriate control group conditional on removing the aggregate di¤erences documented in Figure 2 . Panel B of Table 3 suggests that this strategy is reasonable. Similar to the startups, the facility expansions do not have a lead pattern prior to the interstate reforms; moreover, the dynamic growth in their coe¢ cients is reasonable.
Aside from controlling for potential omitted variables, our identi…cation strategy also has a useful substantive interpretation in that it teases out the di¤erential response of startups to changes in banking deregulations over-and-above the heightened facility expansions of existing …rms. Since startups are particularly dependent on banks for external …nance, these results can also be interpreted as a way to understand how much more important changes in the structure of the banking industry are for entrepreneurship relative to existing …rms.
With this comparison in mind, we move to a more stringent speci…cation that exploits the full potential of the Census Bureau data. We calculate from the LBD entry counts by cells constructed on four dimensions: state, SIC2 industry, year, and type (i.e., startup or existing …rm). Put another way, we stack the data so that both entry types are included in the same regression rather than in separate regressions; we also incorporate the industry dimension. Over 110k observations are created through this technique. We can easily relate this augmented speci…cation, however, to the earlier state-year estimations through the speci…cation, 
T ype t
extends the earlier vector of year …xed e¤ects t to be by T ype. These two extensions allow the startups and existing …rms to have independent panel e¤ects as in Table 3 's separated regressions. The remainder of (3) interacts the dynamic T RA and T ER deregulation indicators from (2) to be by T ype. By interacting both T ype forms, the main e¤ect is dropped and the coe¢ cients replicate the single T ype speci…cations above. 21 The …rst column of Table 4 shows this proposed similarity. The dependent variable is again the log establishment entry counts in constructed cells. The …rst block of coe¢ cients is for the startup type interactions with the two sets of reforms; these coe¢ cients are very close to the estimates in Column 1 of Table 3 . The lower block is interactions for expansions by existing …rms; these parallel Column 2 of Table 3 . These coe¢ cients are estimated jointly, with standard errors conservatively clustered at the state-type level. The minor di¤erences to Table 4 come from including the industry dimension, but the dynamic patterns and coe¢ cient magnitudes are similar to the earlier estimates.
Column 2 of Table 4 extends (3) to include state-industry-year …xed e¤ects. As these additional …xed e¤ects saturate the model, the dynamic coe¢ cients for startup …rms become relative to the establishment expansions of existing …rms. Indeed, this speci…cation is only possible by contrasting types within a state-industry-year cell, and separate coe¢ cients for expansion establishments are no longer estimated. These …xed e¤ects fully absorb changes in local conditions at the state-industry level. They thus account for the state-year and industry-year dynamics typically modelled in this literature, further easing any endogeneity concern. Moreover, the 21 Similar to the earlier speci…cations, we include interactions for Economic Census years and weight the regressions by the 1977-1985 birth employments in the state-industry cell. While all state-year observations have startup and facility expansions, this is not true at the industry level. To maintain a consistent observation count in log speci…cations, we recode a zero entry count as one and include unreported dummies for zero count observations by type. The results are robust to dropping these observation entirely; in general, these cells receive very small weight. …xed e¤ects control for the unique outcomes of specialized state-industry combinations like the software industry in Silicon Valley. 22 From an econometric standpoint, this speci…cation allows us to isolate the elasticity from more potential omitted factors. From a substantive perspective, this second speci…cation directly contrasts the growth of startups following the banking reforms to the establishment expansions of existing …rms.
Column 2's di¤erential elasticity estimate of 11% for startups relative to the opening of new establishments by existing …rms is our preferred estimation. This estimate is statistically di¤erent from zero; recall that this statistical di¤erence could not be established with the earlier state-year estimations. Among states, California has the largest impact on the interstate …ndings, but excluding this state results in only a small elasticity decrease to 8% that remains statistically signi…cant. Columns 3 and 4 report two other robustness checks, the …rst an unweighted speci…cation and the second dropping the period after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 that allowed national interstate branch banking. The continued positive elasticity, along with the dynamic pattern of e¤ects, suggests that the interstate deregulations had a positive impact for entrepreneurship relative to existing businesses. More generally, it points to speci…c …nancing constraints faced by entrepreneurs that were in part eased by these reforms.
Appendix Table 3 further examines whether di¤erences across industries are consistent with our banking constraints and entrepreneurship hypothesis. If startups are more …nancially constrained, the relative entry elasticities of startups compared to facility expansions should be greater in industries that are more dependent on external …nance compared to less dependent industries. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) in constructing a metric of industry-level dependence on external …nance. 23 The higher coe¢ cient magnitudes for …nancially dependent sectors support the theoretical prediction, although some of the long-term elasticities are not statistically di¤erent between the two industry groupings. The di¤erences within manufacturing -the typical sector studied in these papers -are stronger than the overall di¤erences. Overall, the industry dimension again supports the interpretation of interstate banking reforms acting to increase startup entry relative to facility expansions. 22 It is important to note that cross-sectional …xed e¤ects are also included. Estimations without the crosssectional controls can be biased by the non-proportional allocation of industries across states, even if state-year and industry-year controls are included. 23 We compute a measure of external dependence at the SIC2 level through the universe of Compustat …rms in the "Industrial Annual" database for 1990-2000. We then create an indicator variable for an industry being above or below the median external dependence that is interacted with the regressors. Main e¤ects are absorbed into the cross-sectional …xed e¤ects. 24 These results primarily serve as a robustness check and to relate our work to the literature. This test, however, is more stringent than has been identi…ed in prior work on credit constraints. We have three di¤erences: pre-post reforms, startups versus facility expansions, and industry-dependence on external …nance.
Stacked Estimations of Entry Size
Having documented the e¤ect of the banking reforms on the overall entry rates for startup establishments, we turn to the distribution of entry sizes for …rms. Theoretical models suggest that even if potential entrepreneurs are not precluded from starting new businesses due to …nancing constraints, they may still start …rms that are smaller than optimal for the projects at hand (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989). If indeed the increases in relative entry rates are an indication of …nancing constraints facing potential entrepreneurs, we may also …nd e¤ects in the intensive margin of initial …rm employment.
Empirically identifying the e¤ect of changes in …nancing constraints on the intensive margin of entry is complicated, however, by the fact that there are simultaneous changes in both the extensive and the intensive margins. The ideal estimations would compare entry sizes before and after the reforms for …rms that would have entered regardless of the banking deregulations. In this case, average entry size could be an appropriate metric. The earlier estimations, however, document that greater entry is facilitated by the deregulations, and we do not have a way of distinguishing which …rms would have entered in the counterfactual. This is particularly true at the lower end of the size distribution, where we might expect to see the strongest e¤ects on both the intensive and extensive margins of greater …nancial access.
To clarify these issues, we …rst repeat the stacked speci…cation (3) with the vector of stateindustry-year e¤ects for di¤erent entry sizes. We group entering establishments into four size categories based upon employment in the year of entry: 1-5 employees, 6-20 employees, 21-100 employees, and over 100 employees. The coe¢ cients on the banking reform indicators in these regressions estimate the relative elasticity of startup entry to facility expansions within each size grouping. The results of these regressions are reported in the …rst four columns of Table 5 . Table 5 shows that relative growth in startup entry rates following the interstate deregulations are particularly strong at the lower end of the entry size distribution. The increased entry in the 1-5 employee bucket o¤ers the best indication of the extensive margin of entry. The greater relative increase in entry within the 6-20 employee category suggests that the reform may have also a¤ected the intensive margin by boosting the size at which smaller …rms enter. The coe¢ cient in this speci…cation implies a 22% increase in relative entry in the 6-20 employee category following the interstate deregulations. The long-term relative increases are weaker in the larger entry size categories. This entry size pattern is consistent with …nancing constraints impacting both the extensive and intensive margins of entrepreneurship. 25 25 Table 5 …nds more mixed evidence than the aggregate entry regressions regarding the impact of intrastate deregulations. There is some evidence that relative entry rates for startups, especially in the larger size categories, may have declined following these reforms.
We also undertake a second test in Column 5 of Table 5 that employs the longitudinal nature of the Census Bureau data. For each establishment that survives three years, we calculate its entry size relative to the maximum employment it achieves in its …rst three years of operation. We then calculate the mean of this entry size ratio by state-industry-type-year cells. Examining the unweighted means across these cells, startup …rms and facility expansions enter at 68% and 75% of their maximum three-year sizes, respectively. These lower relative entry sizes for startups may directly re ‡ect …nancing constraints on the intensive margin, but the di¤erential may include other factors like increased caution due to greater uncertainty. To assess whether …nancing constraints play an important role, we test whether startups enter closer to their maximum three-year sizes after the banking deregulations. Using the stacked framework (3) with the vector of state-industry-year e¤ects, the estimation is again a comparison to the baseline provided by facility expansions. This approach provides a more direct metric of …nancing constraints on the intensive margin by looking withinestablishment rather than at the cross-section of entry. It is potentially limited, however, by the conditioning on survival for three years. 26 Column 5 of Table 5 again …nds no measurable impact on the intensive margin following the intrastate deregulations. Following the interstate deregulations, however, there was a 2% increase in the entry sizes of startups compared to the maximum sizes they achieved in the …rst three years of operation. This estimation is again a relative comparison to the responses of expansion establishments for existing …rms, providing evidence that entrepreneurs in particular are able to enter closer to their optimal project sizes following the deregulations. While a full analysis of entry sizes requires a broader investigation of the …rm size distribution, this result again suggests that the e¤ects of …nancing constraints for entrepreneurship are present on both the extensive and intensive entry margins.
Stacked Estimations of Establishment Exit Rates and Churn
We now turn to the impact of the banking deregulations on establishment exits and churn. One of the ways that banking deregulations are argued to facilitate the process of creative destruction is through improved allocative e¢ ciency by moving capital away from poor performing …rms to better opportunities (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2006) . Table 6 tests this hypothesis within the US by documenting exit rates across di¤erent parts of the establishment size distribution. As with Table 5 , the coe¢ cients re ‡ect the relative increase or decline in exit rates for single-unit …rms compared to establishments belonging to multi-unit …rms.
Similar to the entry speci…cations, relative exits increased following the interstate deregulations, while no impact is evident with the intrastate reforms. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 document that exit rates for single-unit …rms with 20 employees or fewer increased more than 20% compared to establishments belonging to multi-unit …rms. The relative increase in startup exits with …ve employees or less, in fact, exceed the entry gains documented in Table 5 . However, this is not due to a large, absolute decline in the number of small …rms. Rather, as we document in Table 7 , it is due to the dramatic increase in the number of very short-lived establishments at the lower end of the size distribution. In the growing US economy, …rm starts are greater in number than …rm closures throughout the period studied. Adding these churning establishments to these starts and exits results in a higher elasticity for exits.
Examining the upper end of the size distribution, the relative increase in exits for larger single-unit …rms was substantially smaller than at the lower end. Moreover, the di¤erences between single-unit and multi-unit establishments are only marginally signi…cant statistically. The direction of these responses, however, do suggest that there was not a large-scale increase in the closure of poor performing incumbent …rms following the reforms. If this were true, exit rates for single-unit …rms at the higher end of the size distribution would have been lower. This limited closure suggests that the dramatic increases in entry promoted by the deregulations likely resulted in much smaller changes in product market structure. Table 7 brings these entry and exit results together. We separate entry of new establishments into those that survive more than three years (labeled longer-term entrants) and those that exit within three years of entry (labeled churn). Panel A demonstrates that longer-term entry following the interstate deregulations was fairly consistent across the entry size distribution, with even the largest startup establishments experiencing a 10% increase in entry rates relative to facility expansions. This uniformity across the size distribution contrasts sharply with Table  5 's skewness of overall entry towards the lower end of the size distribution. Since these large establishments are not as likely to be credit constrained on the extensive margin, these results are consistent with the view that allocative e¢ ciency improved following the deregulations. That is, startup …rms may have received …nancing for projects that they would not have prior due the deregulations because they were not 'insiders'or past clients of banks.
Panel B of Table 7 paints a more dramatic picture of the e¤ects of the US banking deregulations. We …nd a 27% increase in churning for startups relative to existing …rms following the interstate banking deregulations. Moreover, all of this churning increase came from …rms that entered with 100 employees or fewer; no response is evident in the largest size category. 27 This enormous increase in short-lived entry of small …rms reconciles Table 5 's skewness of overall entry towards the lower end of the size distribution with the uniformity of longer-term entry across the size distribution evident in Panel A of Table 7 . This churning is further evident in Table 6 's substantial growth in relative startup exits among …rms with 20 employees or fewer.
This substantial increase in the entry of new establishments that fail within three years was not just a consequence of banks learning about di¤erent markets following the deregulations. The dynamic pattern suggests the churning e¤ect grows after the deregulations to its highest level four or more years subsequent to the reform. This pattern also cannot be explained solely through a model of improved ex ante allocative e¢ ciency on the part of banks. Instead, it suggests the deregulations also impact the process of creative destruction by 'democratizing' entry. Many, many more …rms are started, some of which ultimately compete with and perhaps displace incumbents. A large number of these entrants, however, fail along the way.
The outcomes documented in Table 7 suggest that the net result of the US banking deregulations for the displacement of incumbents should be much weaker than the deregulation's impact on entry itself. We con…rm this to be true in estimations that track the …ve or ten largest …rms in 1980 for each state-industry cell over the sample period. We …nd that the interstate deregulations subsequently reduced these (log) incumbent market shares by approximately 0.5%. While this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant, it is modest in economic magnitude. We also do not …nd measurable changes in Her…ndahl indices of local industry structure. These estimations, available upon request, con…rm that the dramatic increase in entry translated much less into changes in overall market leadership. 28 
Conclusions
Although there is a growing consensus that …nancial markets play an important role in driving economic growth, the micro-foundations behind this relationship are much less understood. The role of the banking industry in promoting entry through the e¢ cient allocation of capital is of particular interest in this context, since there is increasing evidence that entrepreneurship plays a key role in facilitating innovation, impacting industry structure, and promoting economic growth. This paper examines how the increase in US banking competition through the deregulation of branch banking a¤ected both the entry and survival of new establishments. We employ B). The dynamic growth in coe¢ cients, along with the general absence of lead e¤ects on the entry and exit margins throughout this paper, mitigates this concern. 28 This result di¤ers from Bertrand et al. (2006) and is most likely due to better pre-reform banking conditions in the US compared to France. unique establishment-level data housed in the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database. These micro-records facilitate several analyses that have not been undertaken in prior work. First, they allow us to compare the elasticity of entry for startups relative to the opening of new plants by existing …rms. This technique controls for a greater set of omitted variables than prior work and isolates better the di¤erential e¤ect of …nancial-sector reforms for entrepreneurship. Second, the longitudinal structure enables examinations of how entry sizes were a¤ected by the reforms, how entry and exit rates changed throughout the establishment size distribution, and how the survival rates of new ventures changed. This detail sheds more light on the mechanisms through which the deregulations impacted product market outcomes.
We do not …nd that the intrastate branch banking deregulations had a consistent, measured impact on either the entry rates or the entry sizes of new establishments. This was true for both startups and the new establishments of existing …rms. Our …ndings suggest that the intrastate branch banking deregulations did not a¤ect the competitive environment of the local banking industry signi…cantly, at least not in such a way that a¤ected the net entry of new businesses.
On the other hand, the interstate deregulations had a strong, positive e¤ect on the entry of startups compared to facility expansions by existing …rms -an overall relative elasticity of 11%. Among startups entering with 20 or fewer employees, the elasticity was even higher at 15-22%. We also …nd evidence for growth in employment size at entry. Overall, our results suggest that the US deregulations reduced …nancing constraints and bene…ted startups more than existing …rms. We also …nd some evidence consistent with the view that the deregulations improved allocative e¢ ciency and somewhat reduced market shares of incumbents in the product markets.
The more striking …nding, however, is the growth in entrepreneurial churn at the lower end of the size distribution. We …nd that the entry of startup establishments that fail within three years increased as much as 30% relative to new establishments of existing …rms. While we are not yet able to distinguish between various explanations for this churning result 29 , it does highlight that the increase in banking competition seems to 'democratize'entry. The US banking deregulations facilitated the process of creative destruction not just by improved e¢ ciency in the ex ante allocation of capital, but also through large-scale entry and e¢ cient closures of …rms ex post.
The churning results also help reconcile the apparent contradictory …ndings of Black and Strahan (2002) , who report large increases in entry rates of startups following the interstate deregulations, and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) , who report a decline in the overall share of …rms at the lower end of the …rm size distribution following the same reforms. We …nd that much of the entry at the lower end of the size distribution was short-lived. Our churning result thus helps explain why the large growth in entrepreneurship did not translate into larger changes in …rm size distribution.
Further, this paper sheds light on a possible reason why studies regarding the e¤ects of banking competition on small businesses have had somewhat contradictory results. Consistent with the literature documenting a fall in credit extended to small businesses in the early 1990s (e.g., Berger et al. 2001 ; Zarutskie 2006), we also …nd a dip in startup activity over that period. Indeed, we further document how the relative growth of startups has lagged behind the growth of establishment openings by existing …rms since the late 1970s (e.g., Davis et al. 2006 ). The positive elasticities of our panel estimations, however, suggest that increases in banking competition in part dampened national declines in startup entry in states that deregulated interstate branch banking relative to states that did not.
We see two areas in particular that warrant further study. First, the speci…c mechanisms through which the increased banking competition impacted entrepreneurial entry should be analyzed, especially the trade-o¤ between greater competition and the bene…ts of relationship banking. The limited impact of the intrastate deregulations for entry rates, especially compared to the interstate deregulations, suggests that either the intrastate deregulations did not have enough bite or that there was something speci…c about the out-of-state banks that was important for promoting entrepreneurship. While some argue that the interstate deregulations enhanced the market for corporate control, others suggest that the main bene…ts of the interstate banking deregulation were the better allocation of credit and the better use of technology by the large, multi-state banks.
Understanding these mechanisms is an important question for future analysis, especially whether the reforms came at the expense of …rms that rely more on soft information. For example, our …ndings that so many …rms fail within the …rst three years, particularly at lower end of the size distribution, leaves open the possibility that there may in fact be a dark side to banking deregulation for entrepreneurial startups as suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1995) . If changes in the organizational structure of banks following the deregulation led to di¤erent lending strategies (e.g., Berger et al. 2005 ; Sah and Stiglitz 1986) or lowered the ability for banks to evaluate projects because of weaker relationships, this may have had negative consequences for the survival of startups.
Second, relating the product market changes due to the US banking deregulations to aggregate productivity growth is an important area of further investigation. Our results, and those of Black and Strahan (2002) , emphasize that interstate banking deregulations had a much larger impact on the entry and exit of …rms than the intrastate deregulations. A number of studies regarding aggregate productivity growth emphasize the importance of reallocations across …rms versus within-establishment growth (e.g., Foster et al. 2001 ). These two literature strands are hard to reconcile, however, with Jayaratne and Strahan's (1996) …nding that intrastate deregulations had a more consistent impact for US output and productivity growth than the interstate reforms. 30 Perhaps our churning …nding can bridge this gap. We intend to investigate this within future studies of how greater …nancial access and increased entrepreneurship might have long-term impacts on industrial structure and economic performance. Small Banks (less than $100m in assets)
Real Gross Industry Assets (in trillions of 1994 dollars) Industry Assets in Megabanks (more than $100b in assets) Industry Assets in Small Banks (less than $100m in assets) Pre-Post specifications compare annual entry rates before and after the state-level banking deregulation indicated. Dynamic specifications replace the post deregulation indicators with a series of leads and lags for each reform. To conserve space, leads and lags are consolidated into two-year increments extending from two years prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the deregulations. The coefficient values for the dynamic leads and lags are relative to the period three years before the reforms and earlier.
Appendix Table 2 presents the complete lag structure for Columns 1-2 and extensions to include linear state time trends. Notes: See Table 4 . All regressions include cross-sectional State-SIC2-Type and longitudinal Type-Year fixed effects. Regressions further include State-SIC2-Year fixed effects that remove all local conditions common across Types. In these saturated models, the start-up response is estimated relative to facility expansions, and separate coefficients for expansion establishments are no longer estimated or reported. Columns 1-4 repeat the full stacked specification (Column 2 of Table 5 ) with births in different size categories. Column 5 substitutes the mean ratio of entry size relative to the maximum size achieved in the first three years of operation. These entry size ratios are calculated at the establishment level and are conditional on survival for three years. Unweighted means from the underlying distributions are calculated for each state-industrytype-year cell.
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